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Introduction
The last few years have seen a reinvention of the economy
through the growth of the "sharing economy" or the "new economy. '
The modern sharing economy is diverse and is made up of various
types of organizations and structures, including shared housing.2
What ties these various components together is that they "generally
facilitate community ownership, localized production, sharing,
cooperation, [and] small scale enterprise."3
The rise of the new sharing economy has been a consequence of
the latest assault on the old American Dream-the version in which
one is "expected to grow up, get a good job, and make money to buy
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Law; J.D, Harvard Law School; A.B., Harvard College. Thank you to my fellow
participants on the "In the Interest of the Community: Public and Private Occupancy
Restrictions" panel at the 2014 Southeastern Association of Law Schools Annual Meeting
(Professors Andrea Boyack, Victoria Mather, Rigel Oliveri, and Marc Roark) for their
comments on an earlier version of this Article; my research assistant Heather Carey for
her excellent research and citation support; and Phillip Jones for his unfailing support. A
special thank you to Andrea Green Jefferson, who has made a bold entree into the sharing
economy. The Barry Law Summer Grant provided helpful support in developing this
Article.
1. See Jenny Kassan and Janell Orsi, The Legal Landscape of the SharingEconomy,
27 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 1, 1-2, 5 (2012) (listing some of the names of the new economy,
such as the "relationship economy," "cooperative economy," "access economy," "peer-topeer (or p2p) economy," and the "grassroots economy").
2. Id. at 3 (noting that the sharing economy consists of "social enterprises,
cooperatives, urban farms, cohousing communities, time banks, local currencies, and [a]
vast array of other unique organizations").
3. Id.
[557]
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all of the things [one] might need."' The realization of this dream,
however, has been hampered by recent negative economic changes.
One pair of commentators has opined that "[t]he sharing economy is
not a top-down solution, meaning that it will not be imposed by a set
of legislated policies ... [Rather], it is being built from the ground up

by every individual and group that chooses to begin consuming,
transacting, or making a livelihood in a new way."5
The sharing economy has redefined consumption in the housing
context in a manner that implicates the exclusivity of the use and
enjoyment of real property. Consequently, just as with other aspects
of use and access to goods, materials, and services in the sharing
economy, housing sharing is predicated on two ideas working in
tandem with one another: (1) that "we can have access to many things
that we need without having to own them all by ourselves, 6 and (2)
that by sharing some of the benefits of property ownership-namely
use and enjoyment-we can also shift some of the (economic)
burdens of ownership.
The number of online platforms designed to link property
owners with potential short-term lessees has grown rapidly over the
last few years. Airbnb, the most well known of these platforms,
describes itself as "a trusted community marketplace for people to
list, discover and book unique accommodations around the world."7
Airbnb boasts that it has connected over twenty-five million guests
with hosted properties in 34,000 cities in 190 countries since its
founding in 2008.8 Airbnb is not only the leading online platform for
the exchange of short-term rentals, recently, it has been the most
controversial as well. 9

4. Id. The myth of the American Dream has taken on many forms. It includes that
version mentioned in the text above, as well as the dream of unfettered reinvention and
self-realization. See, e.g., Lawrence M. Friedman, Name Robbers: Privacy, Blackmail, and
Assorted Matters in Legal History, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1093, 1112 (2002) ("American
society is and has been a society of extreme mobility... People often moved from place
to place; they shed an old life like a snake molting its skin. They took on new lives and
new identities."). The common thread is one of upward social mobility, fueled by hard
work and perseverance.
5. Kassan & Orsi, supra note 1, at 3-4.
6. Id. at4.
7. AIRBNB, About Us, https://www.airbnb.com/about/about-us (last visited Feb. 28,
2015).
8. Id.
9. Airbnb has recently been locked in high-profile legal disputes in New York and
San Francisco, and in smaller markets like Portland, Oregon. These disputes mirror
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Recently, controversy erupted in New York City, Airbnb's

largest United States market."0 In October 2013, New York Attorney
General Eric Schneiderman subpoenaed Airbnb's records, requesting
data on its hosts" for the previous three years."2 Schneiderman
contended that Airbnb hosts in New York City were violating the
New York Multiple Dwelling Law.13

The New York Multiple

Dwelling Law requires that certain multiple dwellings units only be
occupied by "permanent occupants"-those residing in the unit for
thirty or more consecutive days. 4 The Attorney General also
asserted that Airbnb hosts in New York City were not complying with
state and local tax registration and collection requirements."
Many state and local governments rely on their inherent police
powers to regulate short-term housing in residential areas. In
particular, zoning laws-like New York's Multiple Dwelling Lawmay overtly prohibit occupation by short-term renters.

similar battles waged by cities against other new economy sharing platforms, especially
those that are transportation-related.
10. Tom Slee, Trust, Ratings and the Data Behind Airbnb's Host Turnover,
SKIFT.COM (June 12, 2014), http://skift.com/2014/06/12/trust-ratings-and-the-data-behindairbnbs-host-turnover/ (last visited Feb. 28, 2015).
11. Airbnb refers to the property owners who use its platform as "Hosts" and the
lessees as "Guests." AIRBNB, supra note 7.
12. Decision and Order, Airbnb v. Schneiderman, 989 N.Y.S.2d 786 (Sup. Ct. 2014)
(No. 5393-13), available at http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/l159527-airbnb-new
-york-decision.html#document/p9 (last visited Feb. 28, 2015); see also Stephanie Burnett,
Airbnb Hands Over Data on 124 Hosts in New York City to the Authorities, TIME (Aug.
25, 2014), available at http://time.com/3180103/airbnb-hands-over-data-on-124-hosts-innew-york-city-to-the-authorities/.
13. Decision and Order, Airbnb v. Schneiderman, 989 N.Y.S.2d 786 (Sup. Ct. 2014)
(No. 5393-13), available at http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/1159527-airbnb-new
-york-decision.html#document/p9.
14. See id. Article 1, Section 4.8(a) of the New York Multiple Dwelling Law
provides that "[a] Class A multiple dwelling shall only be used for permanent residence
purposes" and defines "Class A dwelling" as including tenements, apartment houses,
studio apartments, duplex apartments, and kitchenette apartments. It further provides
that "[flor purposes of this definition, 'permanent residence purposes' shall consist of
occupancy of a dwelling unit by the same natural person or family for thirty consecutive
days or more and a person or family so occupying a dwelling unit shall be referred to
herein as the permanent occupants of such dwelling unit."
15. See Decision and Order, Airbnb v. Schneiderman, 989 N.Y.S.2d 786 (Sup. Ct.
2014) (No. 5393-13), available at http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/1159527airbnb-new-york-decision.html#document/p9; Affidavit of Sumanta Ray in Opposition to
Airbnb, Inc's Motion to Quash and in Support of the Attorney General's Cross-Motion to
Compel Responses to an Investigatory Subpoena, Airbnb v. Schneiderman, 989 N.Y.S.2d
786 (Sup. Ct. 2014) (No. 5393-13), available at http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/
1145999-new-york-attorney-general-analysis-of-airbnb.html#document/p3.
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Historically, governments have used their police powers to create
and enforce zoning restrictions of this nature for the purpose of
preserving or improving public safety, property values, and the
"character" of residential neighborhoods. These policies are of a
bygone era and are ill-suited to address the modern sharing economy.
Moreover, local governments do themselves a disservice when they
prohibit housing exchanges. Rather than frustrating the goals and
purposes for which old economy regulations were designed (e.g., the
preservation of property values and neighborhood character), such
exchanges may aid in achieving these aims. Additionally, these
restrictions may constitute a regulatory taking of private property
without just compensation in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments. 6
The sharing economy has positively impacted many individuals
and communities, but there is also a brewing conflict between this
genesis and the realities of economic regulation-a conflict of which
the New York Airbnb subpoena controversy is emblematic. Thus, in
the housing context, we see this conflict playing out in the tension
between growing patterns of home sharing and existing regulations
that prohibit such sharing.
This Article focuses on the question of whether municipal
restrictions on short-term leasing constitute unconstitutional takings
of private property without just compensation. Part I gives an
overview of home sharing in the new economy via short-term leasing.
In doing so, it not only examines the controversy in New York, but
also provides a historical perspective on home sharing in the United
States, focusing particularly on the proliferation of boarding houses in
the nineteenth century as a corollary to today's home sharing market.
The examination of this topic is couched in the historical context of
minority, immigrant, and women homeowners' "taking in boarders"
in lean times in an effort to make ends meet and maintain ownership
of their homes. Part II analyzes short-term leasing restrictions under
the Takings Clause. In doing so, it examines the nature of short-term
leasing restrictions and the reasons employed by municipalities to
justify these regulations. Part III discusses the New York Airbnb
controversy. Finally, Part IV argues that such facilitation is desirable

16. The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides, "[Nior shall private
property be taken for public use without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V. The
Takings Clause applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1 ("[N]or shall any State deprive any person of... property, without due
process of law.").
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because municipalities actually do themselves a disservice when they
prohibit these new economy housing exchanges. Such exchanges can
help to preserve property values by providing income to homeowners
that can be used to offset mortgage and maintenance costs-in other
words, sharing the burden of ownership. If homeowners are able to
do so, they are more likely to be able to maintain their homes in the
short-term and, in the long-term to maintain ownership. Moreover,
municipalities may also reap economic benefits from permitting such
exchanges.

1. Housing in the Sharing Economy
A. The Rise of the Housing Segment of the Sharing Economy
Sharing and bartering housing resources is not new. Historically,
the concept has long existed in the context of lodging purchased on a
time- or space-limited basis in inns and boarding houses, rooms for
rent, housing cooperatives, and informal arrangements. 7 The catalyst
for such sharing has often been the quest for affordability, coupled
with housing scarcity. In the contemporary context, we see a home
sharing proliferation, the catalyst of which is also the scarcity of
resources-both affordable housing itself and the monetary resources
to maintain home ownership. What is unique to home sharing in the
new economy is not the sharing, but rather the way in which such
sharing is facilitated by technology and how the use of such
technology is causing innovation in sharing to outpace changes in
housing regulation."
Housing exchanges in the sharing economy often "[s]traddle the
line between personal and commercial" activity-a personal activity
being one for non-pecuniary gain. 9 In the new economy, renting
lodging space-through platforms such as Airbnb-has become a
"sharing enterprise"-"one [that ideally is] aimed at sharing and
offsetting the cost of ownership and maintenance"-rather than
solely a for-profit enterprise, as is common in traditional lodging
17.

See DAVID FAFLIK, BOARDING OUT: INHABITING THE AMERICAN LITERARY

IMAGINATION, 1804-1860 39-41 (2012) (noting that "Dutch merchants [in the New
World] enjoyed the temporary shelter afforded them by boarding as early as the
seventeenth century," acknowledging the long-standing existence of such arrangement in
Europe, and charting its development in America).
18. See Kassan & Orsi, supra note 1, at 5; Molly Cohen and Corey Zehngebot, What's
Old Becomes New: Regulating the Sharing Economy, 58 BOS. B.J. 26 (2014) (noting that
the sharing economy is "[a]n old concept made new through internet-based sharing").
19. See Kassan & Orsi, supra note 1, at 7.
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exchanges (whether long-term such as leasing or short-term such as
hotel room lodging)."
However, "[o]ur laws were designed to
regulate relationships in a competitive economy, not a collaborative
one." 21 This poses a challenge: The relationships in the sharing
economy are often horizontal-involving peers-rather than
vertical-involving a relatively powerful participant and a measurably
weaker one.22 Because of this relational shift, old regulations are
often ill-fitted at best and in many cases, are "unduly burdensome
given that they are designed to protect the powerless against the
powerful and such protections are often unnecessary when
23
relationships are horizontal.
B. Nineteenth Century "Boarding Out" as a Corollary to Today's
Housing Sharing

When viewed in its historical context, modern home sharing is a
predictable phenomenon. Prior to the Civil War, the United States
saw tremendous growth in the number of individuals "boarding
out, ' 24 as the practice was known. By the mid-1800s, three-quarters of
the adults in Manhattan were boardinghouse guests.
This
phenomenon was spurred by the migration of citizens to urban

20. Id.
21. Id. at 13.
22. See id. at 14.
23. Id.
24. Social historian Wendy Gamber notes that although "there was considerable
overlap between [the] various sorts of nineteenth-century housing institutions, and
nineteenth-century observers did not always make hard and fast distinctions," there were
distinctions to be made:
Boardinghouses differed from mere lodging houses in that they
provided meals-usually served at a common table-and
housekeeping services in addition to shelter. Hotels served food and
drink to passersby as well as to occupants; they tended to be more
luxurious,
expensive,
and
architecturally
elaborate
than
boardinghouses. Hotels were usually built for that express purpose,
and almost all hotels were run by men. Boardinghouses on the other
hand, most often were converted dwellings or simply "homes" with
extra rooms to let."
Wendy Gamber, Tarnished Labor: The Home, the Market, and the Boardinghouse in
Antebellum America, in 22 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 177, 181 (Summer 2002).
25. FAFLIK, supra note 17, at 36, 41, 43; see also WALT WHITMAN OF THE NEW
YORK AURORA, EDITOR AT TWENTY-Two: A COLLECTION OF
DISCOVERED WRITINGS (Joseph Jay Rubin & Charles H. Brown eds. 1972).

RECENTLY
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centers from the towns and rural areas and by the ever-growing
population of new immigrant arrivals from Europe:
America's . . . metropolitan industrialization
expose[d] ...the severe housing shortages attendant

on the rapid growth of the urban-industrial showplaces
that were then on offer in the United States.
American manufacturers required workers en masse.
Migrants from the countryside and immigrants from
abroad were ready to oblige. During the 1840s alone,
the two groups together raised the rate of urban
population growth by three times what it was for rural
areas by pouring into the nation's largest cities.26
As these urban centers became increasingly crowded, and the
commodity of affordable housing more scarce, this species of housing
sharing grew. "Housing starts lagged far behind the resultant
increased demand for, and escalating price of, urban domestic
quarters. Only by squeezing more and more bodies into already
crowded home space did antebellum citizens avert an outright
housing crisis."27
Historians estimate that one in five to one in three nineteenth
century American households took in boarders.28 The practice of
29
"taking in boarders" was widespread and crossed class boundaries.
"A respectable widow, fallen on hard times, could easily transform
her home into a boardinghouse.'30 "Whether they sheltered one

lodger or ten, boardinghouses were remarkably diverse
establishments that often catered to residents of particular class,
gender, racial, ethnic, occupational, regional, political moral, or

26. FAFLIK, supra note 17, at 42; see also Gamber, supra note 24, at 178 ("[D]uring
periods of massive urban growth, city dwellers of all classes more likely lived in
boardinghouses than in "homes... Numbering in the thousands, providing "homes for
rural migrants and European immigrants, boarding houses literally underwrote the growth
of urban industry and commerce.").
27. FAFLIK, supra note 17, at 42-43.
28. See Gamber, supra note 24, at 184 ("Social historians who have found that up to
thirty percent of all nineteenth-century households took in boarders may well provide the
closest approximations"); FAFLIK, supra note 17, at 36, 41, 43; see also WALT WHITMAN
OF THE NEW YORK AURORA, supra note 25.
29. Gamber, supra note 24, at 189.
30.

Id.
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religious identities. '' 31 Boarding houses were invariably owned and

operated by members of those same communities-including women,
minorities and immigrants.
II. Short-Term Rental Restrictions As Regulatory Takings
A. The Penn Central Multi-Factor Balancing Test

In an attempt to answer the question of when a regulation goes
too far, the Supreme Court in Penn Central TransportationCo. v. City
of New York32 offered a three-part balancing test, holding that courts

must focus on: (1) the character of the regulation; (2) the extent of the
law's interference with distinct investment-backed expectations; and
(3) the diminution in value of the property resulting from the
regulation.3 This same three-factor balancing test can be applied to

short-term rental restrictions.
1. The Characterof Short-Term Rental Restrictions

Short-term rental restriction can be divided into five types: (1)
full

prohibitions;

restrictions;

(4)

(2)

quantitative

operational

restrictions;

restrictions;

and

(3)

(5)

proximity

licensing

requirements.34

First, those localities that fully prohibit short-term rentals do so
on a community-wide basis.35 However, some municipalities also
enact such full prohibitions only in certain geographical locations,
such as particular zoning districts or neighborhoods.36

Second, municipalities that have enacted quantitative restrictions
allow short-term rentals throughout the community, but limit the
number of such rentals. 7 Often, these communities take the

31. Id. at 182.
32. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
33. Id. at 124-25.
34. Rental restrictions may also be organized with respect to the entity that imposes
them--such entities being local governments, residents, developers or a combination of
these entities. Ngai Pindell, Home Sweet Home? The Efficacy of Rental Restrictions to
Promote Neighborhood Stability 29 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REv. 41, 47 (2009).
35. See, e.g., N.Y. MULTIPLE DWELLING LAW, Article 1, §4.8(a) ("[a] Class A
multiple dwelling shall only be used for permanent residence purposes").
36. See, e.g., MAUI, HAW., COUNTY CODE § 19.37.010 (2014) (Maui County, Hawaii
ordinance limiting "transient vacation rentals" to "destination resort areas" and certain
other business zoning districts).
37. See, e.g., SANTA FE, N.M., CITY CODE §14-6.2(A)(6)(a)(i5)(b)(v) (2009) (limiting
the number of short-term rental permits to 350, unless the dwelling unit in question
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approach of issuing short-term rental permits to property owners, but
capping the number of such permits that may be issued. 38 As an
alternative to an absolute cap, some municipalities mandate that a
certain ratio of long-term to short-term residential use be maintained
throughout the community or within certain designated zoning
areas.39 The impact of either approach is that owners who may want
to enter the short-term rental market may be prohibited from doing
so if the permitting cap has already been reached or if the mandated
ratio cannot be maintained.
Third, in contrast to the quantitative restrictions, some
municipalities restrict new short-term rentals from being located
within a certain distance of an existing short-term rental property.4°
Again, the manner of restriction may have the effect of preventing
new entrants into the short-term market.
Fourth, many regulations restricting short-term rentals focus on
the operational aspects of renting.4
These restrictions are also
designed to prevent new entrants into the short-term rental market.
For example, a municipality may limit the maximum overnight
occupancy of short-term rental properties. Such restrictions may be
based on the number of bedrooms42 in the property or on some other
quantitative aspect of the property. 43 Alternatively, rental period
regulations that limit the number of times that a property may be
rented may be enacted." These types of operational restrictions
increase the cost of providing short-term rentals and, therefore,

qualifies for a permit as an "accessory dwelling unit, owner-occupied unit, or unit located
within a 'development containing resort facilities"').
38. See id.
39. See, e.g., MENDOCINO CNTY, CAL., ZONING CODE § 20.748.020(A) (1995)
(mandating that a ratio of thirteen long-term to one short-term dwelling units be
maintained throughout the county).
40. See, e.g., SAN LUIS OBISPO CNTY, CAL., COUNTY CODE § 23.08.165(c) (2012)
(prohibiting residential vacation rentals from being established within 200 feet on the
same block of any existing residential vacation rental or "visitor-servicing
accommodation").
41. See, e.g., TILLAMOOK CNTY, OREGON ORDINANCE 69 ("Short Term Rental
Ordinance"), Section 6 (Standards)
42. See, e.g., ISLE OF PALMS, S.C., CITY CODE § 5-4-202(a)(1) (2007) (limiting
overnight occupancy to two persons per bedroom, plus an additional two persons).
43. See, e.g., SONOMA CNTY, CAL., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 26-88-120(f)(2)
(limiting maximum overnight occupancy by the design load of the septic system).
44. See, e.g., SANTA FE, N.M., CITY CODE §14-6.2(A)(6)(a)(5)(c)(i)-(ii) (2009)
(limiting short-term rental units to a maximum of seventeen rental periods per calendar
year and limiting properties to one rental per consecutive seven-day period).
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frustrate the very aim of owners, i.e. generating revenue and shifting
(or "sharing") some of the burden of the cost of ownership.
Finally, some local government entities require that property
owners seeking to use their properties for short-term rentals obtain a
license to do so. Such licensing is often conditioned upon the
property's passing various inspections.5 Moreover, licensees may be
subject to the payment of licensing fees and periodic renewals and,
thus, additional fees.
2. The Owner's Investment-Backed Expectations
An owner's investment-backed expectations as envisioned by the
Penn Central Court must be "distinct," rather than merely
hypothetical. 46 For this reason, property owners must be able to show
that they have more than just the potential to share their home on the
short-term market. Rather, they must be able to show that specific
steps have been made toward home sharing. Owners who have
rented their properties on a short-term basis in the past may be best
positioned to fulfill this requirement.
3. Diminution in Value
Diminution in value is determined by comparing the value of the
subject property prior to the regulation with its post-regulation
value. 47 However, the Penn CentralCourt held that diminution in the
value of property does not, by itself, constitute a taking. 48 Rather, it
must be analyzed in conjunction with the owner's distinct investmentbacked expectations. 49 Thus, property owners in a given market may

45. See, e.g., TILLAMOOK CNTY, OREGON ORDINANCE 69 ("Short Term Rental
Ordinance"), Section 6 (Standards) and 9(a)(B) (Short Term Rental Permit Application
Requirements) (2009) (requiring that short-term rental properties be certified by a
building inspector with regard to minimum fire extinguishers and smoke detectors and
emergency escape standards, as well as structural requirements).
46. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124; see also id. at 130 (finding no taking where owner
merely believed it would have the future ability to exploit a property interest in its
building's airspace). The Court relied heavily upon Frank Michelman's influential work
on takings in which he intimated that such investment-backed expectation must be
"distinctly perceived [and] sharply crystallized." Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility,
and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundation of "Just Compensation" Law, 80
HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1233 (1967).
47. See Michelman, supra note 46, at 1232-33 (describing the "fraction of value
destroyed" test).
48. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. 104 at 131.
49. See Michelman, supra note 46, at 1233 (arguing that the diminution in value test
queries "whether or not the measure in question can easily be seen to have practically
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be able to use comparable short-term rental statistics to determine
the pre-regulation value of their property's rental potential. Owners
may possibly even be able to extrapolate value using long-term rental
comparables.
B. Exactions and the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine
In addition to applying the Penn Central multi-factor balancing
test in its analysis of a property owner's takings claim, a court may
also find the unconstitutional conditions doctrine to be instructive in
instances where short-term rental permits are required. This doctrine
was initially introduced in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission0
and has been applied in the context where the state has placed a
condition on the development of property.5 The doctrine was further
refined by the Court in its decision in Dolan v. City of Tigard.2 The
Court's analysis of unconstitutional conditions includes: (1) whether
an "essential nexus" exists between the proposed condition and the
legitimate interest of the state 3 and, if such an "essential nexus" does
exist, (2) whether there is a "rough proportionality" between the
state's justification for the condition and the condition itself.54
1. Essential Nexus
In Nollan, property owners brought an action against the
California Coastal Commission because it had conditioned their
rebuilding permit on a requirement that the owners provide an
easement across their beachfront property.55 The purpose of the
easement was to permit the public to access the two adjacent public
beaches on either side of the Nollans' property. 6 The Commission
claimed that the condition was necessary in order to "protect the
deprived the claimant of some distinctly perceived, sharply crystallized, investmentbacked expectation").
50. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm., 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
51. See id.
52. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994). Even more recently, the Court
noted that the unconstitutional conditions doctrine applies both when permission to
develop property has been denied and when the exaction involved is monetary. Koontz v.
St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2586 (2013). In Koontz, the Court discussed
the policy behind the unconditional conditions doctrine, which included the prevention of
coercion between the state and the individual property owner, as well as a balancing of
costs and harm between the public and individual property owners. Id.
53. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837; Dolan, 512 U.S. at 386.
54. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 386.
55. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 827.
56. Id.
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public's ability to see the beach, assisting the public in overcoming the
'psychological barrier' to using the beach created by a developed
shorefront, and preventing congestion on the public beaches. 5 7 The
Court did not find there to be an essential nexus between the
condition and the state's interest. 8 The Court, therefore, held that
the Commission could not, without paying just compensation,
condition the grant of the permit on such a requirement. 9 Because
the Commission failed to meet the "essential nexus" requirement, the
Court did not reach the second question of the unconstitutional
conditions analysis. 6°
2. Rough Proportionality
The second analytical prong of the unconditional conditions
doctrine was addressed by the Court in Dolan. In Dolan, the
Planning Commission of the City of Tigard, Oregon conditioned the
approval of a landowner's application to expand her store and pave
her parking lot upon her agreeing to dedicate land for (1) a public
greenway along an adjacent creek and (2) a public pedestrian/bicycle
pathway. 6' The Planning Commission claimed (1) that the purpose of
the greenway was to minimize flooding associated with the paving
and the resulting increase in impervious surfaces and (2) that the
public pathway was needed to minimize traffic and congestion.6 2 The
Supreme Court found that both dedication requirements constituted
an uncompensated taking of property despite the fact that there did
exist an essential nexus between the state's interest and the conditions
imposed. 63 Rather, the court found that the burden imposed on the
property owner by the condition was not roughly proportional when
balanced against the state's interest, but was, rather, unduly
cumbersome.6' Likewise, owners of potential and existing short-term
rentals may be able to show that operational, licensing and permitting
requirements, though they meet the Nollan "essential nexus"
requirement, are unduly burdensome because they shift the entire

57. Id. at 825.
58. Id. at 841.
59. Id. at 841-42.
60. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 386 ("We addressed the essential nexus question in
Nollan").
61. Id. at 380-82.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 391.
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burden identified by local communities as justifications for short-term
rental restrictions to individual owners.65
C. Short-Term Rental Restrictions as Inverse Condemnations

Local government regulations restricting the use of real property
for short-term rentals may constitute a "taking" under the Fifth and66
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
Governmental restrictions on the use of real property for the purpose
of short-term rentals may be classed as "inverse condemnation"-an
instance where the government has taken property or impacted
property rights without utilizing the condemnation process and,
therefore, without providing just compensation for the taking.67

Inverse condemnation applies both to physical invasions of private
property and to so-called "regulatory takings"-those instances in

which the government has regulated the use of property in a manner
so as to constitute a constructive taking thereof.68 The genesis of the
65. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 384 (noting that "[o]ne of the principal purposes of the
Takings Clause is to bar Government from forcing some people to bear public burden
which in all fairness and justice should be borne by the public alone").
66. The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides, "[N]or shall private
property be taken for public use without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V. The
Takings Clause applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1 ("[N]or shall any State deprive any person of... property, without due
process of law."); see also Nollan, 483 U.S. at 827 (noting the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment is made applicable to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment). A
property owner who is seeking to establish a claim pursuant to the Takings Clause must
identify (1) the property taken; (2) the governmental conduct that resulted in the taking;
and (3) the just compensation that would remedy the taking. See generally 3 SANDS,
LIBONATI & MARTINEZ, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW: A TRANSACTIONAL APPROACH

§16.53.20 (2000).
67. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. L.A. Cnty., 482 U.S.
304, 317 (1987) ("While the typical taking occurs when the government acts to condemn
property in the exercise of its power of eminent domain, the doctrine of inverse
condemnation is predicated on the proposition that the taking may occur without such
formal proceedings."). If the government would like to acquire private property for public
use, it must usually commence by attempting to negotiate a purchase agreement with the
owner. If its attempts at negotiation fail, it will begin the condemnation process via the
courts. At trial the government has to establish authority to condemn, which may require
it show that the proposed taking is "necessary," thus establishing its authority to condemn
the property. If successful, the government will be required to pay just compensation to
the owner for the taking. See JESSIE DUKEMINIER, JAMES E. KRIER, GREGORY S.
ALEXANDER & MICHAEL H. SCHILL, PROPERTY 1081 (2010) (7th ed. 2010).
68. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982)
("[A] permanent physical occupation authorized by government is a taking without regard
to the public interests that it may serve."); Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922)
("The general rule at lest is that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if
regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.").
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idea of the "regulatory taking" can be found in PennsylvaniaCoal Co.
v. Mahon,69 wherein Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., writing for
the Court, famously concluded that, with regard to government
regulation of property rights, "[t]he general rule at least is that while
property may be regulated to a certain
extent, if regulation goes too
7
far it will be recognized as a taking. 1
HI. The New York Airbnb Controversy
As noted in the Introduction, New York's Attorney General
subpoenaed Airbnb's records on its New York City hosts, contending
that some of those hosts were in violation of the New York Multiple
Dwelling Law and were not complying with state and local tax
registration and collection requirements. 7' Airbnb moved to quash
the subpoena, arguing that:
(i) there is no reasonable, articulable basis to warrant
such an investigation and the subpoena constitutes an
unfounded "fishing expedition"; (ii) any investigation
is based upon laws that are unconstitutionally vague;
(iii) the psubpoena is overbroad and burdensome; and
(iv) the subpoena seeks confidential, private
information from petitioner's [Airbnb's] users.72
Judge Gerald W. Connolly of the Supreme Court of New York,
Albany County held that the subpoena must be quashed because the
requests contained therein were overly broad. 73 The court made this
69. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
70. Id. at 415. The issue in Pennsylvania Coal was whether the effect of the Kohler
Act-which prohibited the mining of anthracite coal in a manner that, among other things,
would cause subsidence to any residential structure-amounted to a taking. The Court
held that "[t]o make it commercially impractical to mine certain coal has very nearly the
same effect for constitutional purposes as appropriating or destroying it."
71. See Decision and Order, Airbnb v. Schneiderman, 989 N.Y.S.2d 786 (Sup. Ct.
2014) (No. 5393-13), available at http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/1159527airbnb-new-york-decision.html#document/p9 (last visited Feb. 28, 2015); Affidavit of
Sumanta Ray in Opposition to Airbnb, Inc's Motion to Quash and in Support of the
Attorney General's Cross-Motion to Compel Responses to an Investigatory Subpoena,
Airbnb v. Schneiderman, 989 N.Y.S.2d 786 (Sup. Ct. 2014) (No. 5393-13), available at
http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/1145999-new-york-attorney-general-analysis-of
-airbnb.html#document/p3.
72. Decision and Order, Airbnb v. Schneiderman, 989 N.Y.S.2d 786 (Sup. Ct. 2014)
(No. 5393-13), availableat http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/1159527-airbnb-new
-york-decision.html#document/p9 (last visited Feb. 28, 2015).
73. Id.
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determination despite its finding that a predicate factual basis had
been established with "evidence [supporting the assertion that a
substantial number of Hosts may be in violation of the Multiple
Dwelling Law and/or New York State and/or New York City tax
provisions.

74

The court also held that Airbnb's constitutional vagueness
argument was not yet ripe for review because there was no actual
controversy ongoing between the state and the hosts. 75 Additionally,
the court held that Airbnb had failed to show that the information
requested by the subpoena was confidential.76
The court noted that the subpoena demanded information on
"all Hosts that rent Accommodation(s) in New York State." The
Multiple Dwelling Law, however, applies only to "cities with a
population of three hundred twenty-five thousand or more.,77
Moreover, the court found fault with the subpoena's not limiting its
request to rentals of less than thirty days.78
With respect to the tax-related allegations made by the Attorney
General, the court also took issue with the fact that the subpoena was
not limited to New York City hosts and did not take into account the
various exceptions to the state and city tax regulations.79 In
particular, the court noted that the Attorney General acknowledged
the existence of exceptions to the hotel occupancy tax that exempted
hosts who rented their properties "for less than 4 days, or for fewer
than three occasions during the year (for any number of total days)."'

74. Id.; see also Affidavit of Sumanta Ray in Opposition to Airbnb, Inc's Motion to
Quash and in Support of the Attorney General's Cross-Motion to Compel Responses to
an Investigatory Subpoena, Airbnb v. Schneiderman, 989 N.Y.S.2d 786 (Sup. Ct. 2014)
(No. 5393-13), available at http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/1145999-new-yorkattorney-general-analysis-of-airbnb.html#document/p3.
75. See Decision and Order, Airbnb v. Schneiderman, 989 N.Y.S.2d 786 (Sup. Ct.
2014) (No. 5393-13), available at http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/1159527airbnb-new-york-decision.html#document/p9 (last visited Feb. 28, 2015).
76. See id. (last visited Feb. 28, 2015) (noting that petitioner's privacy policy provides
that it will disclose hosts' information at its discretion).
77. N.Y. MULTIPLE DWELLING LAW § 3.
78. See Decision and Order, Airbnb v. Schneiderman, 989 N.Y.S.2d 786 (Sup. Ct.
2014) (No. 5393-13), available at http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/1159527airbnb-new-york-decision.html#document/p9 (last visited Feb. 28, 2015).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 13 (quoting Respondent Memorandum in Opposition).
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One day after the court's ruling, the Attorney General issued a
second subpoena to Airbnb.81 This second subpoena was revised to
address the court's concerns about over breadth." Less than one
week after the issuance of the second subpoena, Airbnb and the
Attorney General entered into an agreement whereby Airbnb would
provide the Attorney General with anonymized data on its New York
City hosts. 3 If after reviewing such data, the Attorney General or the
New York City Office of Special Enforcement instituted an
investigation of or undertook an enforcement action against a specific
host, Airbnb agreed that it would provide non-anonymized
information on that host.'
Five months later, in October 2014, Attorney General
Schneiderman

released Airbnb in the City, a report on the

information that it had gathered from Airbnb as a result of the May
2014 agreement. 85 The report analyzed Airbnb bookings for "private
stays" ' in New York City from January 1, 2010 through June 2, 2014

(referred to in the report as the "Review Period")." According to the
report, during the Review Period, "72 percent of units used as private
short-term rentals on Airbnb appeared to violate [the Multiple
Dwelling Law]." '

81. See Benjamin Snyder, New York Attorney General Issues New Subpoena in
Airbnb Case, FORTUNE (May 15, 2014), available at http://fortune.com/2014/05/15/newyork-attorney-general-issues-new-subpoena-in-airbnb-case/ (last visited Feb. 28, 2015); see
also Letter from Attorney General Eric T. Schneiderman to Belinda Johnson, General
Counsel, Airbnb, Inc. (May 20, 2014), available at http://www.ag.ny.gov/pdfs/OAGAirbnbLetter_of_Agreement.pdf (last visited Feb. 28, 2015) (noting that a subpoena for
records was issued on May 14, 2014).
82. See Snyder, supra note 81.
83. See Letter from Attorney General Eric T. Schneiderman to Belinda Johnson,
supra note 81.
84. See id. Airbnb has so far complied with this agreement, supplying the Attorney
General with anonymized information on approximately 16,000 hosts, and in August 2014,
giving the Attorney General specific, non-anonymized information on 124 hosts. See
Stephanie Burnett, Airbnb Hands Over Data on 124 Hosts in New York City to the
Authorities, TIME (Aug. 25, 2014), available at http://time.com/3180103/airbnb-hands-overdata-on-124-hosts-in-new-york-city-to-the-authorities/.
85. New York State Office of the Attorney General, Airbnb in the City (Oct. 2014),
availableat http://ag.ny.gov/pdfs/Airbnb%20report.pdf (last visited Feb. 28, 2015).
86. A "private stay" is one in which the entire house or apartment is available to the
guest and the host is not present in the unit during the stay. Id. at n.1.
87. Id. at 2.
88. Id. at 2,8.
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The New York Attorney General's earlier subpoena and eventual
conclusions regarding Airbnb and its hosts is emblematic of the
tension inherent in the current regulatory scheme. A revision of the
underlying policies justifying the restricting of short-term rentals is
necessary in order to align our legal framework with our new
economic reality.
IV. Justifications for Municipal Short-Term Rental
Restrictions
Communities justify restrictions of short-term leasing using
various lines of reasoning, the most prominent of which (1) relate to
protecting property values and the character of the neighborhood; (2)
focus on issues related to taxation and revenue; or (3) are public
safety-based.89
A. Property Values and Character of the Neighborhood
Conventional thinking has been that short-term rental
restrictions increase property values by causing owners to adhere to
maintaining a gold standard of single-family ownership and
occupancy.'
However, it is possible that property values may
increase as a result of the government allowing owners to enter into
the short-term market, especially if, in the long-run, by doing so, the
owner is able to alleviate some of the burden of ownership and
thereby avoid deferring maintenance or, in the extreme, avoiding
foreclosure.
The argument regarding the protection of the character of a
particular residential neighborhood pits permanent residents against
short-term residents and the owners that rent to them. Permanent
residents may argue that short-term tenants do not have ties to the
community and do not or cannot, therefore reflect the values of the
community. These arguments conflate the length of stay in a
community with the ability (or more precisely the inability) to be a
good neighbor.
B. Revenue and Competition with Licensed Lodging
The hotel industry has lobbied for bans prohibiting short-term
rentals, or at the very least, tougher regulations that would compel

89.
90.

See generally Pindell, supra note 34, at 46-48.
See id.
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owners to pay the same sorts of occupancy taxes and other fees to
which licensed hotels are subject.91

By the same token, local

governments have often couched their objections to prohibit shortterm rentals in terms of lost hotel occupancy tax revenue. 92
C. Public Safety
Local governments argue that the state is obliged to regulate the
relationship between property owners and renters in order to protect

the public from possibly unsafe lodging situations.93
Thus,
municipalities argue that occupancy limits and inspection
requirements, for example, are not designed to prevent owners from
entering the rental market, rather they are meant to ensure that the

renting public remains safe.94 As noted above, this reasoning is best

suited for a regulatory scheme that is mediating vertical relationships,
rather than horizontal peer-to-peer relationships that have the

tendency to be self-regulating. Such burdensome requirements may
have the unintended consequence of creating an "underground"
market for short-term housing rentals. In essence, this is what is
happening in municipalities with total bans as well. Although hosts
are using a publicly accessible website to facilitate sort-term rental
relationships, these hosts have often taken the calculated risk of
disregarding bans or onerous regulation in order to shift a portion of
their ownership burden, thus creating a "black market" in housing
sharing.

91. See Airbnb Versus Hotels: Room for All, For Now, THE ECONOMIST (April 26,
2014), available at http://www.economist.com/news/business/21601259-there-are-signssharing-site-starting-threaten-budget-hotels-room-all (last visited Mar. 6, 2015); Jim
Edwards, Why Hotel Industry Lobbyists Want a Global Crackdown on Airbnb, BUSINESS
INSIDER (May 27, 2015), available at http://www.businessinsider.com/why-hotel-industrylobbyists-want-a-global-crackdown-on-airbnb-2013-5 (last visited Mar. 6, 2015).
92. See, e.g., Decision and Order, Airbnb v. Schneiderman, 989 N.Y.S.2d 786 (Sup.
Ct. 2014) (No. 5393-13), available at http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/1159527airbnb-new-york-decision.html#document/p9.
93. See New York State Office of the Attorney General, supra note 85, at 20-27
(Affidavit of Thomas Jensen, Chief of Fire Prevention, New York City Fire Department);
id. at 28-37 (Affidavit of Vladamir Pugach, Associate Inspector for New York City
Department of Buildings).
94. See New York State Office of the Attorney General, supra note 85, at 20-27
(Affidavit of Thomas Jensen, Chief of Fire Prevention, New York City Fire Department);
id. at 28-37 (Affidavit of Vladamir Pugach, Associate Inspector for New York City
Department of Buildings).
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Conclusion
Some who are actively studying the emergence of the sharing
economy have proposed a new American Dream comprised of four
platforms: (1) building relationships for casual, spontaneous, and onetime transactions; (2) building agreements; (3) building organizations;
and (4) building larger-scale infrastructure.95 Similar guidelines could
be adopted in the short-term housing regulation context. It is
possible that "[e]nvisioning the sharing economy in this way makes it
easier to let go of the original American Dream." 96
By providing short-term rentals, owners may shift and share the
burden of homeownership. This shifting can help to defray mortgage
and real estate tax costs. Moreover, the sharing of this burden,
through the consequent sharing of the benefits of homeownershipuse and enjoyment in particular-can help to avoid or at least
mitigate instances of blight due to disrepair, distressed sales at below
market rate sales prices, and even foreclosures. Thus, allowing
owners to share homeownership can protect a community's property
values by helping to insulate individual owners from the effects of
negative housing market downturns.

95.
96.

See Kassan and Orsi, supra note 1, at 10-12.
Kassan and Orsi, supra note 1, at 12.
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